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BEYOND THE BONE-HARD CONFINES 
OF THE MIND; DENKDICHTUNG AND 
THE RECLAMATION OF ETHICS 
Walter Tonetto 
Die Religion, die bloss auf Theologie aufgebaut ist, 
kann niemals ctwas Moralischcs enthalten. 
Kant, "uber Pedagogik", Werke, VIII. 
I 
The hubris of the great Kcna Upanishad - not resulting in the kind of 
nemesis we are accustomed to - provides lhc backdrop to my 
reflcctions.1 Most of the fourth part of lhis panishad, providing a 
taxonomy, elucidates the tatus of the gods - an Eastern Thomism of 
sort , and no less magisterial - in terms of the gods' respective 
distances to the Eternal. Theomachy turns into joyously ineffable 
theodicy. 
But my departures arc returns, and the Kena Upanishad serves also 
as a caveat for my ruminations in the following. Without 
'demythologizing' (Prof Kurt Hnbner, after all, has already refuted 
BuiLmann's as ault)/ we hold Agni as a seer-will, kavikratu; he is the 
"will in the heart", kratur hrdi. Cognate constellations will, of course, 
be found in all major religions. Without this "will in the heart" - the 
equipoise of volition - nought avails, and we will hardly emerge from 
the morass of ontolo-litcrary perplexity. This is my dominant burden, 
which I seek to lighten. And thus when 1 cite in my proemial remark 
Kant's exhortation, I am positioning the argument towards the 
miscellany of artistic activity falling in tine with inspirational 
paradigms. This is notwithstanding its friction with contemporary 
di cursive practices. Principally two rea on account for this subjective 
revival: one, to remind ourselves of a certain Indo-European etymon -
for the root 'mon' 'to think', 're-member', unalterably pertains to the 
offices of the poet whatever our dissension with mythical ideas; and 
two, because everything we are and possess in this world has been 
facilitated by an-other; and finally because thinking - frequently 
untouched by the freight of disquisilive practice - reside in a 
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thatched, dilapidated cabin, perhaps with head tilted to the side 
(putting the helm a-starboard), not thrust upward in condescendent 
avuncular motion by the chin. The elevated angle, presenting a 
shortfall in humility, signifies the caput mortuum in more ways than 
one! 
My last trope sketches the adversity of all critical and creative 
endeavour, for the self-styled intellectuals in our midst often carry 
their hauteur like frogs that gloriously swell before ignominiously 
bursting. To give an Oriental hue, and to cool the coat (though perhaps 
in some ways to inflame the hide), most so-called 'thinking' proceeds 
indeed from what the homo indicus might call the vital mind, a frontal 
formation of the vital Purusha, or Conscious-Being. On the other hand, 
the function of the thinking mind proper, the buddhi, is to think and 
reason, perceive and evaluate. So I massage snake-oil into the lobes 
and forehead, drop a coin down the slot, and the goes 
'puff' ! Even adept and exhilarative reflexive manoeuvring, if it fails to 
create, remains reflexive, only rearranges the corpse of thought? The 
majority of theorists today are little more than morticians; rarely are 
they psychopomps. Disporting airily up and down an abandoned 
Jacob's Ladder is not perforce to gain admittance to any of the higher 
echelons of the intellectual Empyrean. 
Tall ladders carry commensurate risks. We need look closer to the 
ground for a dependable measure. Heidegger's Was heisst Denken? not 
only links Denken, thinking, to Danken, thanking, but he also speaks of 
"denkend dichten", which I propose to conflate to Denkdichtung, a 
cumbrous nomenclature, but implicitly sanctioning the pectinate and 
pensive, philosophico-poetical strain - the consilience of purposive 
aesthetic zeal at the core of the ostensibly singular exertions of the 
philosophic and poetic acts.4 But we can take this a step further; 
Denken facilitates understanding, for the Anglo-Saxon root of 
understandan means literally 'to stand under or among', foiling more 
elevated posture. And so it is with the word 'humble', springing from 
the Latin root 'humi', 'on the ground', abutting on 'homage', with 
which we are all familiar, if rather depreciatively. 
The immediate advantage of territorial fellowship is in the 
obligation it imposes, of what Kant, in The Metaphysic of Morals, calls 
a Tugendverpflichtung, obligatio ethica; its freedom, to be sure, comes 
later; Tugendpflichten or officia ethica furnish, as Cicero's De Amicitia 
already makes plain, mutual respect, amor benevolenti,u. Philosophy 
cannot continue treading about slipshod, indisposed to affirming its 
foundations, while poetry's aerial longing is seen to entrust itself (at 
1994 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 399 
least provisionally) to accepting ethic's tellurian injunction that issues, 
and whets, touchstones of human answerability. We begin, of course, 
with deficit and disequilibrium, which might never be satisfactorily 
rescinded; that is not the point; Hamann indeed has shown that the 
philosopher-historian produces not only Dichtung of a much lesser 
value than the poet, but Dichtung itself is more philosophical than any 
arrangement and explication of facts, however abstract and sprightly 
these be. But in the programmatically intuitive splicing of 
Denkdichtung, reciprocal respect and guidance governs the relations, 
and each province of knowledge attains to its arc of fulness. 
Das Bekannte nberhaupt ist darum, 
weil es bekannt its, nicht erkannt. 
Hegel, Vorrede zur des Geistes. 
III · 
Yet today we arc standing between a wall of rain and a scrap of sun; 
the rainbow we see is no longer one of promise - even its colours have 
dulled, like a skyline scumbled after too many strafings - and the 
rainwall pledges to engulf us. What is the calamitous flaw; is there a 
medicina catholica that will rehabilitate us? We will come to that in a 
moment. 
There must be will, good-will - the seer-will - for the hybrid 
Denkdichtung to become possible, for rain to pass and for stability to 
return to the celestial motions, viewed from afar and fixed on the 
corona of the heart. But there are truculent obstacles in our way, 
positions that need re-defining, knowledge that demands reclaiming. 
Kant's categorical imperative, the autonomy of the will, and his 
Gewissensbegriff (concept of conscience) have all but disappeared. 
That ethics should only as recently as Kant have received its 
Selbstbewusstsein (self-consciousness), and so quickly forfeited it again, 
is - as Vanessen astutely remarks - unique in history.5 "The loss of a 
fixed position", he adds, "brings with it a loss of safety, which is 
detectable in every question. And since this safety takes the form of 
thought, we have actually to register a loss of knowledge".6 
How does contemporary theory deal with any of this? The empty 
can of the sign and its unceasing interrogations bring up only tinny 
sounds, never the shifting of tectonic plates, nor the grave rumblings of 
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thunder. For that the can would have to be placed into hands of flesh, 
turned in the garish sun, cracked on the asphalt, or pitched, finally (not 
quite a shell, but no matter), far into the sea. That none of this occurs, 
of course, makes the single most astounding factor of contemporary 
theory its unforfendable boredom. 
Allowing for my impressionistic shorthand, what then of the desire 
to mediate between theology and literature, given that it is unlikely to 
revive any spirits, living or dead. Yet Hart has managed in The 
Trespass of the Sign to engage even the most recalcitrant reader. 
Even theorists need their beginnings, and Hart's prejacent position to 
unravelling his mottled theology is that memorable episode with the 
Edenic apple, retailed now by Dante, but whether it is hard rind or 
verjuice of extant, undifferentiated knowledge that prompts Adam's 
flagrant transgression, remains concealed; Hart's position is concerned 
with linguistic and para-linguistic operativeness, implementing a 
metaphysic of presence, which embargoes any suggestion of taste 
(elementary of aesthetic), or mythical motivity. Yet in a very acute 
sense, Hart unwittingly exposes the complicity of academicians in the 
contemporary philosophico-literary bedlam, and ends by eliminating, to 
his deficit, the terminal locus For the concern of the arts, 
and of theology (if it is not to desiccate from sheer ennui) is to seek 
out liveliness in the action of a spiritual impetus; hence its pulpy 
carapace requires unremitting lubrication. Adam's hermeneutic in the 
eighth heaven of Paradise, Hart avers, is sovereign: the distinction 
between signum and res significata, between the sign and the offence it 
delineates, complete; the thing at issue is 'the trespass of the sign', an 
offence against Divine injunction. So far so good; or is it? Is that first 
step altogether sound? Well, not quite. For one the vagrant sentry of 
Barthes' primary and secondary semiological system slumbers 
hereabouts and has just been trodden on (we will put him back to 
sleep in a twinkling, after putting a question or two); for another -
concerned with effects, and thus moral positions - there begins to 
resound a necessitas peccandi of the actions surrounding the hapless 
apple-tree, evolving a fraught and tenuous status from which even 
these observations are rather feckless attempts at extrication. For how 
else can I voice my individual trespass, blunderbuss my noisy knowing, 
without this first offence, which henceforth legitimates the variety of 
apostasy from the proffered Edenic ideal? We are the begetters of a 
knowledge that is becoming increasingly 'differentiated', no longer 
between good and evil (untenable contraries to many theorists) but 
between shades of a continuum that reject the serviceable 
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post-lapsarian binarism. Hart's traditional construal of the Fall situates 
Pascal's wager as a revivified Kantian 'Sicherheitsmaxime',7 now on 
permanent loan to infidel philosophers. That a few shekels invariably 
fall into his can - wherein the sign has decomposed - fatally flaws his 
position, removes any claim to objectivity. 
Why this plaint laid at Hart's door? Is not his skotoma or blindness 
characteristic of legions of literary philosophers and embryonic 
theologers? Yes, but Hart is also in the vanguard of a licensing activity 
that causes the last plates of our exilic bedrock to shift, and shifting, to 
knock us off our feet. The fact is often undervalued that the Fall is a 
falling, hasn't yet consumed the fuel of its evil consequences, despite 
our critical pou stou having received a buffing of the floor-boards that 
makes our thought ever more slippery. Hart is also, by recoiling from 
grounded positions and first states, downgrading the logocentric 
function of creation, removes the rebuttal and surrebuttal, slips from 
the bench into the dock. The prelapsarian state, we recall, would have 
assured a continuance of undivided as well as unmediated knowledge, 
without partitioning thought and its expression: 
Tu credi 'l vero; che i minori e' grandi 
di questa vita miran nella speglio 
in che, prima che pensi, il pensier pandi.8 
Thus Dante's ancestor Cacciaguida in Canto XV of the Paradiso, some 
eleven cantos before Adam makes his entrance, which Hart escorts all 
the way, and beyond: 
A redeemed soul, entirely consonant with God's will, Adam 
knows Dante's thoughts with far more certainty than Dante 
can know the most elementary truth; his perception of the 
poet's mind is immediate, unhindered by language.9 
For all the level planes, Hart's suggestion reads 'language' as little 
more than words uttered in speech. We balk at that 'far greater 
certainty'; had not Cacciaguida, despite his thoughts' range "high above 
the mark of mortal kind" (in that respect analagous to Adam's) 
suggested an equality in the speechless transmission of thought? 
Certainly Adam seems not to know or care that Dante's aptitude (nor 
that of other, lesser beings sojourning in this sphere) is the transfer of 
thoughts; perhaps his overweening pride reaches here once more, 
unwittingly, to the fore. Yet the greater embarrassment comes with 
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Hart's notion of language as hindrance, and immediately shows his 
hand (sans the stigmata). It is indeed quite the reverse; Cacciaguida is 
overwhelmingly emphatic that though his answer is already decreed, he 
wants to hear la voce tua sicura: 
Let thy voice firm, bold and glad proceed; 
Utter the will, utter the wish whereto 
My answe.r hath already een decreed.10 
Speech affirms choices and identities, expresses the wiU, binds to 
consequences. Language is the carrion c mfort (pace Hopkins) of 
linguists, speech the preserve of p ets. 11 There i an unimpeachable 
creative spur alive in speech, notwithstanding aJJ alleged defects in a 
defective world. Adam's alleged hermeneutic mastery is in the mirror 
of Cacciaguida - closer an ancestor to the poet than the prosaic Adam 
is to either - far removed from the ribbon of linguistic mastery that 
Hart covets to stick to his lapel. 
Ingesting the forbidden fruit from the Tree of Knowledge, as it is 
dubbed, cannot be construed as ubordinate to the trespass - as act it 
retains primacy, for it is in the act that a division of kn wledge takes 
place, a schism between good and bad knowledge, even if we express 
it here for the sake of pragmati m in the form of a solecism. Perhaps 
we are reminded in some ways of Faust and Mephistopheles' wager 
with God, of the question if the Deed precedes the Word. 
Here the question of 'knowledge' needs to be briefly addre sed. 
Prclapsarian knowledge, though being undifferentiated, is nonetheless 
knowledge of a hod that allows Adam and Eve to make an intelligent, 
responsible choice. The choice of what is contrary to knowledge 
(knowledge in the sense of freedom from error) is consequently more 
than mere trespass of what reads, anthropomorphically, as little more 
than dogmatic intransigence. And here i the rub. We ingest that 
forbidden fruit every time we trespass not the moral law (as defined in 
terms of laws and injunction ) but the inner law, held in place by 
discrimination and at an angle to the Dantean mirror of the Empyrean 
inside the heart. The Fall is historical and extra-historical - it repeats 
itself, as I have already suggested - whenever we choose sophistry over 
philosophy. 
But we need to probe deeper. The Adamic act of ingestion is itself 
an incorporation of falsehood - a fear heretofore, one supposes, wholly 
external to Man, and henceforth passed on Lo generations. To speak 
only of a trespass of God's injunction, though indubitably the central 
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issue (if we only look at the tap of the gamboge perplexity) is to 
abevacuate the dynamic moment of choice, and to offer no direction 
out of the tangle of false and true knowledge. The alternative to 
nominating, even if not securing, the determinative power of the logos, 
is Nimrod's domain, a proliferation of tongues, vociferous spruikers, 
and inconsolable mountebanks of every persuasion. If I seek to 
intervene in momentous creative acts, I need to know well the before 
and the after, to discriminate in my account, and to protect those 
things of value. We nudge the sentry of Barthes' semiology, whom we 
neglected earlier; he sputters, then rises to his feet. Hart's reasoning 
leans heavily on Barthes' supposition that the world is void of the 
mythos - and of mythical antecedents, he confides - which Prof Hnbner 
has shown to be erroneous in every respect, and which needs no 
elaboration. That Hart cites Barthes' idea that God is never a signifier, 
reveals both Barthes and Hart's misapprehension that God and any 
ascriptive process is ever anthropomorphic, leading (one may pardon 
my tautology) to a sterile nominalism. A point that is clearly lost on 
Derrida - for 'God' in the shape of word is ironically construable in 
infinite ways, as Hart himself implies by positioning Nietzsche's rather 
moralistic spirit of "God is dead" as expressive of either the 
impossibility of locating a transcendent point, or as a formula of 
unbelief or disbelief - thereby incidentally missing the fact that he is 
biting again into the apple's soured rind. The point, surely, is one of 
common-sense; Nietzsche's declaration remains a proffering of the 
forbidden apple, the verjuice of anticipatory intelligence, whether we 
stew it or take it straight. 
The triune rood of Gemnt, Gestalt and Symbol lies in pieces, 
seemingly unresurrectable, certainly inexpressible, of bleached utility in 
a specious age. The symbol as retinaculum elementorum, the rope of 
the elements, has become a noose to the things it would amorously 
bind. The forest of dead signifiers is not fortuitously 'dead', sapped of 
life, but in its disseminative moods seeks to make food offered to the 
dead palatable. The brilliance of Nietzsche, who emerges in Hart from 
time to time, is full of shadows, occasionally hits with his hammer a 
twisted nail: 
I want, once and for all, not to know many things. Wisdom 
sets limits to knowledge too.12 
He could hardly have spoken to a deeper purpose. But the shadows 
prevail in the final telling, grotesque in the immense hubris, long 
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before his drift into insanity: 
This treatise ... gay and fateful m tone, a daemon rising to 
laughter: there is nothing more substantial, independent, 
iconoclastic more evil. 13 
Is Nietzsche the mystagogue presented by Hart to counter Kant? It 
seems that way, and Hart finds considerable dissatisfaction with a 
little-known paper Kant penned in 17%: Von einem neuerdings 
erhobenen vornehmen Ton, where Kant proposes that the assertions of 
mystics generate an Afterphilosophie, occasionally spell its end. That 
"recently elevated tone", however, is something Kant ascribes to all 
thinkers who don't have to work to make a living; he is evidently 
reproving the lack of systematism and method in charlatans (it is 
doubtful, Hart recognises, if Kant has read Eckhart, et alia), who 
would implicitly pose the greatest risk to a recognition of his difficult 
oeuvre, a foreboding which the passage of time has more than 
vindicated. We must also understand Kant's reservations in context of 
his psychiatric studies, especially his Versuch nber die Krankheiten des 
Kopfes, where Gemntskrankheiten, diseases of the mind, are explored, 
often being the result, he says, of a neglect of the reasoning apparatus. 
Hence the pr,uvisio sensitiva - the prescience of extrasensory 
intelligence - must rightly appear suspect to a system that seeks to 
raise the Selbstbestimmung, the knowledge of selfhood, from nothing 
but the debris of self. G f tama the Buddha is curiously alike in this 
avoidance of metaphysical discussion, for similarly compelling reasons; 
his brief, like Kant's, was quite different; for all the idealism it was 
entirely practical in the beginning, the middle, and the end. 
But that the sacred love I watch within 
With constant gaze, and which doth 
in me breed 
Sweet longing, may the more fruition 
win, 
Let thy voice firm, joyous and bold proceed .... 
Dante, Paradiso, Canto XV. 
IV 
Endings recall beginnings, and we are once more propelled towards 
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the question of ethics. The meaning of ethos is dwelling, abode, natural 
domicile; it can also more specifically denote the place of a plant or an 
animal. Its sense of place suggests genius loci and provenance. But as 
Vanessen points out, it has a double-meaning, denoting 'pen of an 
animal', "the prison of animalistic impulses." This ambiguity makes it 
such a ballle-ground for Sittlichkeit, morals. 
Hegel's Logic shows how a quantitative increase of gases abruptly 
results in a qualitative change. Philosophy has become almost 
overnight an unfamiliar and estranged bedfellow of the enquiring mind. 
In this dilemma Hart, equitable and benevolent, befriends the strange 
creature, seeks conciliation. Yet the apoplectic burden of rus 
philosophy remains: the Procrustean couch of wayward sophistry 
alternately sounds the cracking of ligaments and bones, and the 
compression of blood. The creature that is released in the end has 
changed beyond recognition, but at least alterity has once more been 
contained. Except the blood, you see; the memory of the blood, 
keeping the claims of feeling alive. 
Hegel's Aufhebung, sublation, finds no sanctuary that preserves: the 
rather more virulent Destruktion of Heidegger and coterie have 
despoiled our culture of any certainty, and left behind the withering 
flower of scepsis. In this alone we see that Heidegger, like Nietzsche, 
clomb the asperous path between the quintessence of meaning and the 
chasm of the void: indeed, without sharp discrimination, the 'thanking' 
of thinking turns into arrogation and hubristic assumption. The flower 
of scepsis only grows in the shade, and needs to be watered by black 
night. The wizened strip of rainbow that leans woe-begone into its cup 
begins to falter from the skies. A still-life, to be sure, but one endowed 
with symbolical strength. For just at the point where its back is about 
to bend to the cusp of the earth and the unstrung bow of hope, it 
remembers; as does the sun, dispelling a monumental wall of rain. 
Victoria 
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